De waarde van bankrelaties tijdens bankcrisissen: De case Rusland

Nico

De Neve

De recente kredietcrisis heeft de wereld opnieuw duidelijk gemaakt dat bankfalingen niet

behoren tot het verleden of enkel tot financieel onderontwikkelde landen. Door het netwerk dat

banken vormen en het grote risico dat banken durven nemen krijgt prudentieel toezicht opnieuw

de volle aandacht. Gaandeweg groeit het idee dat overheidscontrole onvoldoende is en dat

alternatieve controleurs van banken te vinden zijn op de markt.

Er bestaat een ruime literatuur over de relaties die banken opbouwen met hun leners. De

algemene strekking is dat bankrelaties waardevol zijn, zowel voor de bank als haar partners. De

literatuur rond relaties die banken met elkaar aangaan is echter en stuk beperkter. Bovendien

duikt de vraag op wat dergelijke relaties waard zijn in moeilijke tijden. Wat als het banksysteem

zelf onder druk komt te staan en banken niet langer in staat zijn om hun verplichtingen na te

komen? Is het zo dat banken op elkaar kunnen rekenen tijdens crisissen?

Door krachtige instituties hebben financieel ontwikkelde landen relatief minder crisissen dan

landen die in volle ontwikkeling zijn. Bijgevolg is er ook minder data beschikbaar waaruit lessen

getrokken kunnen worden. Een land zoals Rusland dat enkele ernstige bankcrisissen achter de

rug heeft, is bijgevolg de ideale uitvalshoek om een beter inzicht te krijgen over hoe bankrelaties

functioneren en kunnen bijdragen tot stabiliteit van de interbankenmarkt.

Bibliografie

- Allen F. en Gale D., 2000, Financial Contagion, Journal of Political Economy, Vol.

108, No. 1, p. 1-33.

- Berger A.N. en Udell G.F., 1995, Relationship Lending and Lines of Credit in Small

Firm Finance, The Journal of Business, Vol. 68, No. 3, p. 351-381.

- Bharath S., Dahiya S., Saunders A. en Srinivasan A., 2007, So what do I get? The

bank’s view of lending relationships, Journal of Financial Economics, 85, p. 368-419.

- Bhattacharya S. en Chiesa G., 1995, Proprietary information, financial intermediation,

and research incentives, Journal of Financial Intermediation, 4, p. 328-357.

- Boot A.W.A., 2000, Relationship Banking: What Do We Know?, Journal of Financial

Intermediation, 9, p. 7-25.

- Boot A.W.A. en Thakor A.V., 1994, Moral Hazard and Secured Lending in an

Infinitely Repeated Credit Market Game, International Economic Review, Vol. 35,

No. 4, p. 899-920.

- Boot A.W. A., en Thakor A.V., 2000, Can relationship banking survive competition?

The Journal of Finance, Vol. 55, No. 2, p. 679-713.

- Boot A.W.A., Thakor A.V. en Udell G.F., 1991, Secured Lending and Default Risk:

Equilibrium Analysis, Policy Implications and Empirical Results, The Economic

Journal, Vol. 101, No. 406, p. 458-472.

- Calomiris C. en Powell A., 2001, Can Emerging Market Bank Regulators Establish

Credible Discipline? The Case of Argentina 1992-1999, in: Mishkin F., Prudential

Supervision: What Works and What Doesn’t, Chicago: NBER and University of

Chicago Press, p. 147-91.

- Cocco J.F., Gomes F.J. en Martins N.C., 2005, Lending Relationships in the Interbank

Market, Working paper, London Business School.

- Cole R.A., 1998, The Importance of Relationships to the Availability of Credit,

Journal of Banking & Finance, 22, p. 959-977.

- Cook D.O. en Spellman L.J., 1994, Repudiation Risk an Restitution Costs: Toward

Understanding Premiums on Insured Deposits, Journal of Money, Credit and Banking,

Vol. 26, No. 3, p. 439-459.

- D’Amato L., Grubisic E., en Powell A., 1997, Contagion, Bank Fundamentals or

Macroeconomic Shock? An Empirical Analysis of the Argentine 1995 Banking

Problems, Working Paper, Banco Central de la Republica Argentina.

- D’Auria C., Foglia A. en Reedtz P. M., 1999, Bank interest rates and credit

relationships in Italy, Journal of Banking & Finance, 23, p. 1067-1093.

- Dahiya S., Saunders A. en Srinivasan A., 2003, Financial Distress and Bank Lending

Relationships, The Journal of Finance, Vol. 58, No. 1., p. 375-399.

- Degryse H. en Van Cayseele P., 2000, Relationship Lending within a Bank-Based

System: Evidence from European Small Business Data, Joural of Financial

Intermediation, 9, p. 90-109.

- Demirgüc-Kunt A. en Huizinga H., 2003, Market discipline and deposit insurance,

Journal of Monetary Economics, 51, No.2, p. 375-399.

- Diamond D.W., 1984, Financial Intermediation and Delegated Monitoring, The

Review of Economic Studies, Vol. 51, No. 3, p. 393-414.

- Diamond D.W., 1991, Monitoring and Reputation: The Choice between Bank Loans

and Directly Placed Debt, The Journal of Political Economy, Vol. 99, No. 4, p. 689-

721.

- Diamond D.W. en Dybvig P.H., 1983, Bank Runs, Deposit Insurance, and Liquidity,

The Journal of Political Economy, Vol. 91, No. 3, p. 401-419.

- Dinger V. en von Hagen J., 2008, Does Interbank Borrowing Reduce Bank Risk?,

Centre for Economic Policy Research Discussion Papers 6635.

- Elyasiani E. en Goldberg L.G., 2004, Relationship lending: a survey of the literature,

Journal of Economics and Business, 56, p. 315-330.

- Flannery M., 1998, Using Market Information in Prudential Bank Supervision: A

Review of the U.S. Empirical Evidence, Journal of Money, Credit, and Banking, 30, p.

273-305.

- Flannery M. en Nikolova S., 2004, Market Discipline of U.S. Financial Firms: Recent

Evidence and Research Issues., in: Hunter W.C., Kaufman G.G., Borio C. en

Tsatsaronis K., Market Discipline across Countries and Industries, Cambridge: MIT

Press, p. 87-100.

- Freixas X., Parigi B.M. en Rochet J., 2000, Systemic Risk, Interbank Relations, and

Liquidity Provision by the Central Bank, Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, Vol.

32, No. 3, p. 611-638.

- Furfine C.H., 2001, Banks as Monitors of Other Banks: Evidence from the Overnight

Federal Funds Market, Journal of Business, vol. 74, No. 1, p. 33-57.

- Furfine C.H., 2002, The interbank market during a crisis, European Economic Review,

46, p. 809-820.

- Guelpa F. en Tirri V., 2006, The Effect of Market Structure and Relationship Lending

on the Likelihood of Credit Tightening, The European Financial Management

Association Confereance Papers, 2006 Madrid Meeting.

- Hamilton J.D., 1996, The Daily Market for Federal Funds, The Journal of Political

Economy, Vol. 104, No. 1, pp. 26-56.

- Hannan T.H. en Hanweck G.A., 1988, Bank Insolvency Risk and the Market for Large

Certificates of Deposit, Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, 20, No. 2, p. 203-211.

- Harhoff D. en Körting T., 1998, Lending relationships in Germany - Empirical

evidence from survey data, Journal of Banking & Finance, 22, p. 1317-1353.

- Ho T.S.Y. en Saunders A., 1985, A Micro Model of the Federal Funds Market, The

Journal of Finance, Vol. 40, No. 3, p. 977-988.

- Ioannidou V.P. en de Dreu J., 2006, The Impact of Explicit Deposit Insurance on

Market Discipline, CentER Discussion Paper, Tilburg University.

- Jiangli W., Unal H. en Yom C., 2008, Relationship Lending, Accounting Disclosure,

and Credit Availability during the Asian Financial Crisis, Journal of Money, Credit

and Banking, 40, No. 1, p. 25-55.

- Karas A., Pyle W., Schoors K., 2006, Sophisticated Discipline in Nascent Deposit

Markets: Evidence from Post-Communist Russia, William Davidson Institute

Working Paper No. 829.

- King T.B., 2008, Discipline and Liquidity in the Interbank Market, Journal of Money,

Credit and Banking, 40, No. 2-3, p. 295-317.

- Levy Yeyati E., Martinez Peria M.S. en Schmukler S.L., 2004, Market Discipline in

Emerging Economies: Beyond Bank Fundamentals, CIF Working Paper, Universidad

Torcuato Di Tella.

- Martinez Peria M.S. en Schmukler S.L., 2001, Do Depositors Punish Banks for Bad

Behavior? Market Discipline, Deposit Insurance and Banking Crises, The Journal of

Finance, Vol. 56, No. 3, p. 1029-1051.

- Ongena S. en Smith D.C., 2001, The duration of bank relationships, Journal of

Financial Economics 61, p. 449-475.

- Park S., 1995, Market Discipline by Depositors Evidence from Reduced Form

Equations, Quarterly Review of Economics and Finance, Vol. 35, p. 497-514.

- Peltoniemi J., 2007, The Benefits of Relationship Banking: Evidence from Small

Business Financing in Finland, Journal of Financial Services Research, 31, p.153–

171.

- Peresetsky A.A., Karminsky A.M. en Golovan S.V., 2007, Russian banks' private

deposit interest rates and market discipline, BOFIT Discussion Papers 2/2007.

- Petersen M.A. en Rajan R.G., 1994, The Benefits of Lending Relationships: Evidence

from Small Business Data, The Journal of Finance, Vol. 49, No. 1, p. 3-37.

- Rajan R.G., 1992, Insiders and Outsiders: The Choice between Informed and Arm's-

Length Debt, The Journal of Finance, Vol. 47, No. 4, p. 1367-1400.

- Rochet J. en Tirole J., 1996, Interbank lending and systemic risk. Journal of Money,

Credit, and Banking, 28, No. 4, p. 733-762.

- Semenova M., 2007, How depositors discipline banks: The case of Russia, Economics

Education and Research Consortium, Working Paper Series, No 07/02.

- Sharpe S.A., 1990, Asymmetric Information, Bank Lending and Implicit Contracts: A

Stylized Model of Customer Relationships, The Journal of Finance, Vol. 45, No. 4, p.

1069-1087.

- Sironi A., 2003, Testing for Market Discipline in the European Banking Industry:

Evidence from Subordinated Debt Issues, Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, 35,

No. 3, p. 443-472.

- Stiglitz J.E. en Weiss A.W., 1981, Credit Rationing in markets with imperfect

information, American Economic Review, Vol. 71, No. 3, p. 393-410.

- von Thadden E.L., 1998, Asymmetric information, bank lending and implicit

contracts: The winner’s curse, Finance Research Letters, 1, p. 11–23.

- Thakor A.V., 1996, Capital Requirements, Monetary Policy, and Aggregate Bank

Lending: Theory and Empirical Evidence, The Journal of Finance, Vol. 51, No. 1, p.

279-324.

- Ungan E., Caner S., Özyıldırım S., 2008, Depositors’ Assessment of Bank Riskiness

in the Russian Federation, Journal of Financial Services Research, 33, p. 77-100.